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Abstract 
To measure a person’s risk-taking tendency, research has relied interchangeably on self-
report scales (e.g., ‘Indicate your likelihood of engaging in the risky behavior’) and more 
direct measures, such as behavioral tasks (e.g., ‘Do you accept or reject the risky option?’). It 
is currently unclear, however, how the two approaches map upon each other. We examined 
the relationship between self-report likelihood ratings for risky choice in a monetary gamble 
task and actual choice, and tested how the relationship is affected by task ambiguity (i.e., 
when part of the information about risks and benefits is missing) and age. Five hundred 
participants (aged 19-85 years) were presented with 27 gambles, either in an unambiguous or 
an ambiguous condition. In a likelihood rating task, participants rated for each gamble the 
likelihood that they would accept it. In a separate choice task, they were asked to either 
accept or reject each gamble. Analyses using a signal-detection approach showed that 
people’s likelihood ratings discriminated between accept and reject cases in their choices 
rather well. However, task ambiguity weakened the association between likelihood ratings 
and choice. Further, older adults’ likelihood ratings anticipated their choices more poorly 
than younger adults’. We discuss implications of these findings for existing approaches to the 
study of risk-taking propensity, which have often relied on self-reported risk tendency for 
ambiguous activities.
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In the province of Quebec, some casino managers have made the remarkable step of allowing 1 
their clients to ban themselves from entering the establishment (Ladouceur, Jacques, Giroux, 2 
Ferland, & Leblond, 2002). Self-exclusion programs are intended to help gambling addicts 3 
avoid situations in which they believe they cannot resist temptation. Although many fail to 4 
comply with their agreement (Ladouceur et al., 2002; Ladouceur, Sylvain, & Gosselin, 2007), 5 
gamblers who commit to these programs do so because they anticipate that they will not be 6 
able to resist the lure of the casino. An ability to anticipate whether one will engage in a risky 7 
activity is crucial, as it empowers individuals, such as the self-excluding gamblers, to avoid 8 
situations in which their choices can have serious negative outcomes. Here, we ask how well 9 
people actually know the daredevil within them. 10 
In psychology, researchers have employed various methodological approaches to 11 
assess individual differences in risk-taking tendency. One prominent approach has been to 12 
use self-report measures, where people are asked to indicate their likelihood to engage in a 13 
risky behavior (Blais & Weber, 2006; Rolison, Hanoch, Wood, & Pi-Ju, 2014; Weber, Blais, 14 
& Betz, 2002). For example, in the Domain Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT; Weber et 15 
al., 2002) respondents are asked to evaluate their own likelihood of risk taking for various 16 
risky activities and behaviors (i.e., ‘Indicate your likelihood of engaging in…’) by rating 17 
themselves on a Likert scale (from 1 = ‘Not at all likely’ to 7 = ‘Extremely likely’). 18 
Individual differences in self-reported risk taking likelihood have been shown to be correlated 19 
with individual differences in real-world behaviors, such as the trading volume of financial 20 
investors (Markiewicz & Weber, 2013) and health behaviors, including smoking (Hanoch, 21 
Johnson, & Wilke, 2006). 22 
However, self-report measures have potential shortcomings. For instance, 23 
individuals might lack insight into their own attitudes or behavioral tendencies and thus fail 24 
to accurately report on their likelihood of risk taking (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; 25 
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Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Individuals may also envision negative 26 
consequences of admitting to risky behaviors, motivating them to moderate their responses to 27 
comply with perceived social norms (Nederhof, 1985; Fisher, 1993). An alternative approach 28 
has been to measure behavior directly using decision making tasks (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, 29 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Holt & Laury, 2002; Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; Figner, 30 
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; Wichary, Pachur, & Li, 2015). In these tasks, 31 
individuals decide on the basis of explicitly described or experienced outcomes and 32 
probabilities of the choice options. For example, respondents may be asked whether they 33 
accept a hypothetical gamble that offers a 25% chance to win $30 and a 75% chance to lose 34 
$10. Risk taking in such behavioral tasks has been shown to be associated with personality 35 
characteristics (Lauriola & Levin, 2001) and real world behaviors, such as smoking and drug 36 
use (Lejuez et al., 2002), and criminal offence (Pachur, Hanoch, & Gummerum, 2010; 37 
Rolison, Hanoch, & Gummerum, 2013). 38 
An implicit assumption in this research is that self-reported likelihood of risk taking 39 
and actual choice behavior tap into the same underlying attitudes toward risk. In other words, 40 
if an individual takes few risks in their decision making, then they should also report a low 41 
likelihood of risk taking, indicating that they know their inner daredevil. On the other hand, 42 
studies on metacognition have revealed dissociations between self-judgments and behavior 43 
on a range of cognitive tasks (Koriat, 1997; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993). For 44 
instance, people are often overconfident in the accuracy of their intuitive judgments and in 45 
their general knowledge (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; 46 
but see Juslin, Winman, & Olsson, 2000). Further, people seem to have a limited ability to 47 
accurately predict the impact of outcome magnitudes and probabilities of options on their 48 
actual choice (e.g., Morewedge, Gilbert, Keysar, Berkovits, & Wilson, 2007; Gilbert, 49 
Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004). In studies of memory, subjective confidence and actual 50 
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recall accuracy are often poorly correlated (e.g., Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987). 51 
One reason is that when asked to rate how confident they are in memory recall, people tend to 52 
consider in their ratings also factors that they believe do but in fact do not improve memory 53 
(e.g., luminance; Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 2000; Rhodes & Castel, 2008). In 54 
Rhodes and Castel (2008), participants predicted that they would better recall words 55 
presented in a larger font size, despite font size having little actual effect on recall. People 56 
have also been shown to express different preferences among options depending on whether 57 
the preference is elicited through a behavioral choice or a rating task (Goldstein & Einhorn, 58 
1987; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Despite these reasons for possible discrepancies between 59 
self-ratings of risk taking likelihood and actual choice behavior, to our knowledge no 60 
previous study has explored how the two measures of risk propensity map upon each other. 61 
Our goal in this article is to fill this gap. To characterize the relationship between 62 
self-report ratings of the likelihood of taking a risk and actual risky choice, we use a signal 63 
detection theory (SDT) approach (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). 64 
From this perspective, a likelihood rating is seen as an attempt to discriminate between cases 65 
where a gamble is accepted (signal trial) and cases where a gamble is rejected (noise trial). 66 
Because gambles vary in their attractiveness and because choice behavior is stochastic (e.g., 67 
Mosteller & Nogee, 1951), acceptance and rejection cases are represented as two probability 68 
distributions. One end of the continuum represents a low attractiveness of a gamble, whereas 69 
the other end represents a high attractiveness. To the extent that an individual’s likelihood 70 
ratings accurately discriminate between acceptance and rejection cases, the overlap between 71 
the two distributions is larger or smaller. For example, if the two distributions do not overlap 72 
at all, then high likelihood ratings are given only to those cases where a gamble is accepted. 73 
On the other hand, if the two distributions overlap entirely, then the likelihood ratings are 74 
entirely dissociated from the person’s actual choice behavior. 75 
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The SDT framework is useful because it allows us to disentangle discriminability (or 76 
sensitivity) and response criterion in the likelihood ratings. Discriminability represents the 77 
accuracy with which acceptance and rejection cases can be told apart; the response criterion, 78 
in contrast, represents the threshold on the strength of attractiveness continuum beyond which 79 
gambles receive a high likelihood of being chosen (i.e., higher than the midpoint of the scale, 80 
representing neither likely nor unlikely). For example, with a high (i.e., conservative) 81 
response criterion only few cases receive a high likelihood rating. Conversely, with a low 82 
(i.e., liberal) response criterion many cases receive a high likelihood rating. The SDT 83 
framework thus enables us to independently assess how sensitively likelihood ratings reflect 84 
actual choice behavior as well as identify response tendencies in the likelihood ratings. For 85 
instance, it could be that in the likelihood ratings respondents have a bias to downplay their 86 
risk-taking tendency, which would be indicated by a conservative threshold. As we describe 87 
in the next two sections, with the SDT measures of discriminability and response criterion we 88 
can also test how the mapping between likelihood ratings and actual choice is affected by the 89 
ambiguity of the options in the task and age, and to what extent people’s response tendencies 90 
in the likelihood rating task are adaptive—in the sense that they respond to differences in the 91 
frequency of risk-seeking behavior.  92 
Does Ambiguity Affect the Correspondence between Self-Report and Choice? 93 
Laboratory tasks that measure risk taking typically provide complete information 94 
about all the outcomes (e.g., win $30 or lose $10) and probabilities (e.g., 25% chance to win 95 
and 75% chance to lose) of the choice options. In many real world situations, however, 96 
decisions must be made without the luxury of knowing all the possible outcomes and 97 
probabilities. For example, the chance of winning a national lottery jackpot rise and fall 98 
according to weakly ticket sales; and a homebuyer cannot know how financial markets will 99 
influence their future mortgage repayments. Many of the activities used in self-report risk 100 
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taking scales represent such ambiguous options. For instance, one may not know all the 101 
possible consequences associated with ‘Going white-water rafting at high water in the spring’ 102 
or ‘Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game’ (DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006), 103 
let alone their precise probabilities. Ambiguity likely imposes additional demands on 104 
people’s ability to self-reflect on the likelihood of their risk behavior. When activities are 105 
vague about their possible outcomes (e.g., ‘Going white-water rafting at high water in the 106 
spring’; DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006), or the possible outcomes and probabilities are 107 
unknown and need to be inferred or estimated, people must engage greater cognitive effort to 108 
assess their own likelihood of risk taking. If ambiguity weakens the degree to which self-109 
reported likelihood ratings and choice behavior are associated, then this would have 110 
implications for the reliability of self-report scales. 111 
Further, people are less likely to choose an option when some of its characteristics 112 
are ambiguous (i.e., one or more of the outcomes or probabilities is unknown; Ellsberg, 1961; 113 
see also Camerer & Weber, 1992; Hsu et al., 2005) than when all characteristics are known. 114 
Does people’s criterion setting in the likelihood ratings reflect this difference in choice? 115 
Analyses of criterion setting in discrimination tasks have shown that people adaptively adjust 116 
their response criterion according to the base rate of signal events (Estes & Maddox, 1995; 117 
Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). For example, in a memory study, Estes and Maddox (1995) found 118 
that participants shifted to a more liberal criterion when memory test sets contained a 119 
majority of previously studied (i.e., old) items compared to when the proportion of old and 120 
new cases was balanced. Are a person’s likelihood ratings of risky choices similarly sensitive 121 
to the reduced tendency to choose a risky option under ambiguity? If so, people’s response 122 
criterion should be more conservative than when an option’s outcomes and probability are 123 
fully provided. 124 
Reduced Correspondence Between Self-Report and Choice in Older Adults? 125 
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To the extent that, as described above, accurate likelihood ratings require greater 126 
reflective effort than choices, discriminability may be reduced in older than in younger 127 
adults. Controlled cognitive processes (e.g., explicit memory) that are linked to metacognitive 128 
abilities necessary for self-reflection show age-related decline (Hartshorne & Germine, 2015; 129 
Salthouse, 2006). Moreover, relative to younger adults older adults seem to be constrained in 130 
drawing samples from memory (Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, & Nilsson, 2008)—which might 131 
be necessary to accurately assess the likelihood of one’s behavior. Older adults also show 132 
greater decrements in decision quality when choosing between multiple options than when 133 
choosing between only two (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). Hence, older adults may be 134 
poorer than younger adults at discriminating risky and safe choices on the basis of their 135 
likelihood ratings. If so, age-related differences on self-report measures of risk taking may be 136 
biased by age differences in people’s ability to self-reflect on their choice behavior.    137 
Further, a wealth of research exploring individual differences in risk taking has 138 
shown that older adults are typically less willing to take risks than younger adults (Denburg, 139 
Tranel, & Bechara, 2005; Henninger, Madden, & Huettel, 2010; Rolison, Hanoch, & Wood, 140 
2012; Zamarian et al., 2008). If response criterion in likelihood ratings is adaptive, older 141 
adults should show a more conservative criterion. 142 
Aims of the Current Study  143 
To examine the relationship between self-reported likelihood of choosing a risky 144 
option and actual choice behavior, participants were shown the same set of gambles in two 145 
types of tasks. In one of the tasks, they were asked to report their likelihood of risk taking 146 
(“Indicate the likelihood that you would accept this gamble”), and in the other task, to make 147 
choices (“Do you accept or reject this gamble?”). On the basis that self-report measures 148 
typically study ambiguous real world activities whereas behavioral tasks usually make 149 
information about all possible outcomes available, we examined whether task ambiguity 150 
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affects the relationship between likelihood ratings and choice. On the basis that likelihood 151 
ratings might require greater reflective effort than choices, we further examined whether 152 
individual differences in decision making, and in particular age differences, affect the 153 
mapping between likelihood ratings and choice behavior. In addition, we tested whether 154 
reductions in the willingness to choose a risky option under ambiguity and in older adults 155 
would be accompanied by a corresponding shift in response criterion in the likelihood 156 
ratings; and whether individual differences in risky choice in general are accompanied by 157 
differences in response criterion. 158 
How Well Do People Know Their Inner Daredevil? 159 
Methods 160 
 Participants. We recruited N = 500 respondent (245 females) via Mechanical Turk 161 
on Amazon. Data reliability of the Amazon Mechanical Turk participant pool has been 162 
validated elsewhere by comparison with other recruitment methods (Berinsky, Huber, & 163 
Lenz, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010). Participants were awarded $1.00 on 164 
completion of the unambiguous task and $1.50 on completion of the ambiguous task owing to 165 
the extended length of the task (see Materials and Procedure). Fifteen participants in the 166 
unambiguous condition and 41 participants in the ambiguous condition failed to complete the 167 
study and were thus removed from all our analyses to follow. All were United States (US) 168 
residents. Participants’ internet protocol (IP) address was used to confirm their geolocation in 169 
the US. Participants took on average 13 minutes and 40 seconds (SD = 7 minutes: 21 170 
seconds) to complete the study. Participants ranged from 19 to 85 years of age (M = 44.86; 171 
SD = 15.71). One hundred twenty five were aged 19-30 years, 102 were aged 31-40 years, 71 172 
were aged 41-50 years, 77 were aged 51-60 years, 119 were aged 61-69 years, and six were 173 
aged 70-85 years. Almost all participants (98%) had completed lower secondary or 174 
vocational education and more than half (62%) had completed higher vocational or university 175 
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education. A minority (7%) had an annual household income below $10,000. For most, their 176 
household income ranged $10,000 and $50,000 (54%) or $50,000 and $60,000 (30%). Few 177 
(9%) had a household income above $100,000. 178 
 Materials. We constructed 27 two-outcome gambles using a factorial design (see 179 
Appendix A), each consisting of a gain amount ($10, $20, $30), a loss amount ($10, $20, 180 
$30), and chances to win and lose, respectively (25%, 50%, 75%). In the unambiguous 181 
condition, complete information about the gain and loss amounts and the chances to win and 182 
lose of each gamble was provided. In the ambiguous condition, the gain amount, loss amount, 183 
or the chances to win and lose was not provided (as indicated by a “?”; Appendix A). 184 
Design and procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to receive either 185 
unambiguous (N = 249) or ambiguous (N = 251) gambles (see Appendix B for instructions). 186 
In a likelihood rating task, participants viewed the same 27 gambles and were asked “Please 187 
indicate the likelihood that you would accept this gamble” on a 7-point scale (1 = “extremely 188 
unlikely”, 2 = “moderately unlikely”, 3 = “somewhat unlikely”, 4 = “not sure”, 5 = 189 
“somewhat likely”, 6 = “moderately likely, 7 = “extremely likely”). The likelihood rating 190 
scale was modelled after rating scales used in the literature to measure risk-taking propensity 191 
(Blais & Weber, 2006; Weber et al., 2002). In a choice task, participants were asked for each 192 
of the 27 gambles “Do you accept or reject this gamble?”. They indicated choice by selecting 193 
an “accept” or “reject” option. The order of the two tasks was counterbalanced. Within each 194 
task, participants were presented each gamble one at a time in random order. A blank screen 195 
followed each response before presentation of the next gamble in the set. 196 
In the ambiguous condition, participants were additionally presented with a third 197 
task that followed the choice task and likelihood rating task and were asked to indicate for 198 
each of the 27 gambles what they believed to be the unknown gamble amounts and chances. 199 
We recorded participants’ responses about the missing values on the basis that their 200 
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judgments might provide an indication of their perceptions of the expected value of 201 
ambiguous gambles (see Appendix C for full description). The gambling problems were 202 
presented in the same format as in the choice and likelihood rating tasks. Participants were 203 
asked “What do you think is the most likely amount that can be [won, lost]” for ambiguous 204 
gambles in which the gain or loss amount was unknown, and were asked “What do you think 205 
are the most likely chances of winning and losing” when the outcome chances were 206 
unknown. Participants chose among the candidate amounts and chances. Finally, all 207 
participants then provided their demographic information. 208 
Results 209 
We first briefly summarise analyses of participants’ choices and likelihood ratings 210 
(see Appendix C for full description), showing that they exhibit several established 211 
regularities. Specifically, participants accepted gambles with a higher expected value more 212 
often than ones with a lower expected value and they also provided higher likelihood ratings 213 
for the former. Further, gambles were less often accepted in the ambiguous than in the 214 
unambiguous condition and there was a trend toward lower likelihood ratings for ambiguous 215 
gambles; replicating previous findings, participants were thus ambiguity averse. We also 216 
found that compared to younger participants, older participants accepted the gambles less 217 
frequently and also provided lower likelihood ratings. Two-way interactions revealed that 218 
participants were less responsive to differences in the expected value of ambiguous gambles 219 
than they were for unambiguous gambles in both their decisions and likelihood ratings. Age 220 
interacted with the expected value of gambles, such that older age was associated with 221 
reduced sensitivity to differences in the gambles’ expected values. 222 
Next, we examined the relationship between participants’ likelihood ratings and 223 
choices by conducting an SDT analysis. Hit and false alarm rates were calculated individually 224 
for each participant. Hit rates equalled the total number of accepted (in the choice task) 225 
INNER DAREDEVIL 
12 
 
gambles where the participant indicated (in the likelihood rating task) a high likelihood rating 226 
(i.e., > 4) and half of the cases with a neutral rating (i.e., = 4) divided by the total number of 227 
accepted gambles. False alarm rates equalled the total number of rejected (in the choice task) 228 
gambles where the participant indicated (in the likelihood rating task) a high likelihood rating 229 
(i.e., > 4) and half of the cases with a neutral rating (i.e., = 4) divided by the total number or 230 
rejected gambles. To ensure robust hit and false alarm rates also when there are only few 231 
signal and noise trials, in the calculation of the hit and false alarm rates 0.5 was added to the 232 
numerator and 1 to the denominator (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Discriminability scores, d’, 233 
were calculated as the standardized difference between the hit and false alarm rates (d’ = 234 
ɀ[hit] – ɀ[false alarm]) and provide a measure of how well participants’ likelihood ratings 235 
discriminated between choices to accept and reject a gamble. A score of 0 indicates that a 236 
participant’s likelihood ratings do not discriminate between their accepted and rejected 237 
gambles and scores > 0 indicate better discriminability. Response criterion scores, C, were 238 
calculated as the mean of the standardized hit and false alarm rates (C = –0.5 × [ɀ{hit} + 239 
ɀ{false alarm}]) and provide a gauge to the threshold on the attractiveness dimension past 240 
which gambles are given a high likelihood rating. Positive scores represent a conservative 241 
criterion; negative scores represent a liberal criterion.  242 
Our SDT analysis showed that whether or not the choice task was completed before 243 
or after the likelihood rating task had no significant influence on discriminability (Mchoices first 244 
= 1.90, Mlikelihood ratings first = 1.78; t(498) = 1.55, p = .123) or the response criterion (Mchoices first 245 
= 0.23, Mlikelihood ratings first = 0.15; t(498) = 1.72, p = .086), indicating that participants’ 246 
likelihood ratings did not simply accord better with their choices when they had already 247 
completed the choice task. Figure 1A shows the average likelihood ratings as a function of 248 
the percentage of accepted gambles split at low and high levels of discriminability. As can be 249 
seen, for participants with lower discriminability the average likelihood ratings were slightly 250 
INNER DAREDEVIL 
13 
 
more regressive, and therefore less indicative of the proportion of accepted gambles, than for 251 
participants with higher discriminability. Figure 1B shows the likelihood ratings as a function 252 
of the percentage of accepted gambles separately for participants who were liberal (i.e., 253 
response criterion < 0) and conservative (i.e., response criterion > 0) in their ratings on the 254 
likelihood scale. Liberal participants awarded higher likelihood ratings to gambles than did 255 
conservative participants (Figure 1B).  256 
Did ambiguity affect the correspondence between likelihood ratings and choice, and 257 
if so, how? As shown in Figure 2A, participants exhibited lower discriminability in the 258 
ambiguous (M = 1.60, SD = 0.82) than in the unambiguous condition (M = 2.09, SD = 0.89). 259 
This difference was confirmed by an independent-samples t-test (t(498) = -6.33, p < .001) 260 
and implies that participants’ likelihood ratings discriminated between acceptance and 261 
rejection cases less accurately in the ambiguous than in the unambiguous condition. The 262 
poorer discriminability for ambiguous gambles may have resulted simply from greater 263 
inconsistency in participants’ ambiguous gamble choices. To assess the role of choice 264 
consistency on discriminability, we took advantage of the nine 3-item sets of gambles in the 265 
stimulus set for which two of the attributes were identical and the third varied (see Appendix 266 
A). For example, for one set of three gambles, the gain amount was equal to $10, the chances 267 
to win and lose were equal to 25% and 75%, respectively, and the loss amount increased from 268 
$10, $20, and $30, respectively. As a measure of consistency, we determined whether 269 
participants showed a monotonic choice pattern across the items as the loss amount increased 270 
from $10 to $30. For instance, accepting the $10 and the $30 losses, but rejecting the $20 271 
loss, or rejecting the $10 and $30 losses, but accepting the $20 loss would indicate 272 
inconsistent choice behavior. For each participant, we counted for how many of the nine sets 273 
of gambles they showed a consistent choice pattern. Not surprisingly, participants were less 274 
consistent for ambiguous gambles (M = 95%, SD = 0.11) than for unambiguous gambles (M 275 
INNER DAREDEVIL 
14 
 
= 97%, SD = 0.07; group difference, t(498) = 2.74, p = .006). However, when controlling for 276 
choice consistency in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), participants still exhibited 277 
poorer discriminability in the ambiguous (Mmarginal = 1.65) than in the unambiguous condition 278 
(Mmarginal = 2.04; F(1,497) = 32.14, p < .001).  279 
Also response criterion differed between the ambiguous and unambiguous 280 
conditions, with the criterion being more conservative in the former than in the latter (Figure 281 
2B; Mambiguous = 0.24, SD = 0.60; Munambiguous = 0.14, SD = 0.49; t(498) = 2.14, p = .033; Panel 282 
C in Figure A1). However, as reported earlier, participants were also less likely to accept the 283 
gamble in the ambiguous than in the unambiguous condition. Controlling risk taking—284 
measured as the percentage of accepted gambles—in an ANCOVA, differences in response 285 
criterion between the ambiguous (Mmarginal = 0.19) and unambiguous conditions (Mmarginal = 286 
0.18) disappeared (F(1,497) = 0.07, p = .786). This indicates that the differences in response 287 
criterion between the ambiguous and unambiguous condition largely reflected an adaptive 288 
response to the differences in the frequency of acceptance cases between the conditions. 289 
How does age influence the correspondence between likelihood ratings and choice? 290 
There was a quadratic age trend in discriminability in the ambiguous condition (βlinear = 1.82, 291 
t = 3.70, p < .001; βquadratic = -1.77, t = 3.62, p < .001), but no age effect in the unambiguous 292 
condition (βlinear = .78, t = 1.65, p = .100; βquadratic = -.73, t = 1.55, p = .123). However, when 293 
controlling for choice consistency, there was a significant quadratic age trend in 294 
discriminability in both the unambiguous (βlinear = 1.11, t = 2.64, p = .009; βquadratic = -1.03, t 295 
= 2.45, p = .015) and ambiguous condition (βlinear = 1.05, t = 2.48, p = .014; βquadratic = -0.99, t 296 
= 2.32, p = .021). Probing the estimated slopes, discriminability changed little from age 19 297 
years (d’unambiguous = 1.56; d’ambiguous = 1.09) to age 40 years (d’unambiguous = 1.75; d’ambiguous = 298 
0.98), whereupon it reduced sharply with age by age 60 years (d’unambiguous = 1.11; d’ambiguous = 299 
0.06) to 70 years (d’unambiguous = 0.49; d’ambiguous = -0.70) and into older age (80 years, 300 
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d’unambiguous = -0.33; d’ambiguous = -1.66). Similarly, a linear regression analysis revealed a 301 
quadratic age trend in response criterion in the ambiguous condition (βlinear = 1.22, t = 2.46, p 302 
= .015; βquadratic = -1.21, t = 2.43, p = .016), but no age effect in the unambiguous condition 303 
(βlinear = -.24, t = 0.50, p = .617; βquadratic = .30, t = 0.63, p = .530).  304 
Finally, we tested for a general association between individual differences in risk 305 
taking—measured as the percentage of accepted gambles—and the response criterion. A 306 
linear regression revealed that higher risk taking was strongly associated with a lower 307 
response criterion (β = -.62, t = 17.48, p < .001; Figure 2D). This strong association remained 308 
after controlling for individual differences in age (β = -.62, t = 17.44, p < .001), which we 309 
found previously were correlated with the response criterion. Inspecting Figure 2D, 310 
participants who accepted fewer than half of the gambles (i.e., were risk averse) had a 311 
conservative response criterion, which means that they falsely identified few instances in 312 
which they rejected a gamble (low false alarm rate), but also missed many instances in which 313 
they accepted a gamble (low hit rate rate). Conversely, participants who accepted more than 314 
half of the gambles (i.e., were risk seeking) had a liberal response criterion (Figure 2D), 315 
meaning that in their likelihood ratings they falsely identified many instances in which they 316 
rejected a gamble (high false alarm rate), but also identified many instances in which gambles 317 
were accepted (high hit rate). This again is indicative of adaptive response criterion setting. 318 
Additionally, and surprisingly, risk taking was also associated with discriminability (β = -.12, 319 
t = 2.70, p = .007): participants who accepted a higher number of gambles tended to show 320 
lower discriminability (Figure 2C). 321 
Discussion 322 
 Research on individual differences in risk taking has implicitly assumed that people 323 
have a very good sense of their inner daredevil and have thus used direct, behavioral tasks 324 
and self-report measures of risk-taking propensity more or less interchangeably. Here, we 325 
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investigated how closely self-reported likelihood of risk taking agrees with actual choice 326 
behavior. 327 
Items in self-report risk taking scales typically refer to rather ambiguous activities 328 
(e.g., ‘Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game’: DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 329 
2006), in which one or more of the outcomes or their probabilities is unknown. In behavioral 330 
tasks, on the other hand, complete information about all possible choice options is usually 331 
either provided (Holt & Laury, 2002; Figner et al., 2009) or this information can be learned 332 
over the course of the experimental session (Bechara et al., 1997; Lejuez et al., 2002). We 333 
therefore tested whether the mapping of likelihood ratings onto choices is affected by 334 
whether the options are ambiguous or not and found that participants were less able to 335 
discriminate between accept and reject decisions for ambiguous problems than for 336 
unambiguous problems (Figure 2). The poorer discriminability also held after controlling for 337 
greater intra-individual inconsistency in participants’ choices for ambiguous gambles. It thus 338 
appears that when choice options are ambiguous, likelihood ratings do not reflect the risk 339 
taking tendencies that determine choice behavior as closely as when the options are 340 
unambiguous. One possible reason could be that ambiguity imposes additional cognitive 341 
demands. When the possible consequences of a risky activity are vague (e.g., ‘Going white-342 
water rafting at high water in the spring’; DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006) or when one or 343 
more of the possible outcomes or probabilities is unknown (e.g., ‘Betting a day’s income at a 344 
high-stake poker game’) the task requires mental simulation of the unknown possible 345 
outcomes and probabilities. In situations of ambiguity, people might, for instance, infer lower 346 
chances from larger payoffs (Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014). When reflecting on the likelihood of 347 
their choice behavior, the mental simulation required in situations of ambiguity presents an 348 
additional challenge for anticipating one’s choices. 349 
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The finding that ambiguity weakens the association between likelihood ratings and 350 
choice has implications for the construction of self-report scales. Researchers need to be 351 
cognizant that items that are highly ambiguous (e.g., ‘piloting a small plane’; DOSPERT; 352 
Blais & Weber, 2006) may not very closely relate to actual risk taking and distort findings 353 
based on self-report scales. From this perspective, it could be interesting to consider to what 354 
extent observed domain differences in self-reported risk taking may be due, in part, to 355 
differences in the degree of ambiguity in some of the items (e.g., Health; ‘Drinking heavily at 356 
a social function; DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006). To examine this, one could attempt to 357 
avoid overly ambiguous items and strive to hold the level ambiguity constant across the sets 358 
of items. Some items could be made less ambiguous by including more explicit information 359 
about the possible outcomes and probabilities. For example, items such as ‘Betting a day’s 360 
income on the outcome of a sporting event’ could be modified to reduce ambiguity and read: 361 
‘Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event when the chances of winning are 362 
advertised to be 1 in 5’. Further, ‘Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability’ could be 363 
modified to ‘Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability and break your leg with a 364 
chance of 10%’. To foster comprehension of the added risk information (and to avoid that 365 
responses are driven more by the person’s numeracy than their risk propensity), the 366 
information could be presented in a graphical format, such as icon arrays (Rolison, Morsanyi, 367 
O’Connor, 2015). Nevertheless, note that in several real-world domains risk information is 368 
naturally present in numerical format (e.g., the betting odds at a sporting event). 369 
Another key finding was that discriminability was negatively affected by age, and 370 
this also held when controlling for age differences in choice consistency. It thus seems that 371 
older adults are less able to anticipate their own risky choices when asked to do so on a 372 
likelihood rating scale. Our finding appears to be at odds with research that has shown a 373 
stronger association between intention and behavior with advancing age (Downs & 374 
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Hausenblas, 2005; Hagger, Chatzisarantis, & Biddle, 2002). However, behaviors used to 375 
study the intention-behavior gap—such as physical exercise, quitting smoking, eating 376 
behavior, and alcohol use—tap into goal setting and implementation, to which older adults 377 
may have more experience than younger adults (e.g., Hagger et al., 2002). One possible 378 
explanation for our finding is age-related decline in controlled cognitive processes (e.g., 379 
Hartshorne & Germine, 2015). Self-report, multi-option likelihood scales might require more 380 
cognitive effort than do simple, binary choice tasks (cf. Frey et al., 2015). Further, the age 381 
differences in discriminability might be due to differences in the ability to mentally simulate, 382 
based on episodic samples drawn from memory, scenarios that are necessary to accurately 383 
gauge the likelihood of one’s own future behavior. Hansson, Rönnlund, Juslin, and Nilsson 384 
(2008), for instance, concluded that older adults’ ability to draw samples from memory is 385 
reduced, hampering their accuracy in metacognitive confidence judgments (see also Hansson, 386 
Juslin, & Winman, 2008). As we did not assess participants’ cognitive functioning, however, 387 
we can only speculate about the possible reasons for age-related reduction in discriminability 388 
in risky choice behavior. Further research could explore to what extent it is indeed lower 389 
cognitive ability that weakens the mapping between likelihood ratings and choice behavior. 390 
This avenue of research could reveal new insight into the degree to which some risk taking 391 
measures are more demanding than others and whether a minimum level of cognitive ability 392 
may be necessary for reliable responding. Nevertheless, our findings imply that researchers 393 
need to be careful when drawing inferences about age differences in risk taking irrespective 394 
of the type of measure used.  395 
Unexpectedly, we found that discriminability was also affected by risk taking 396 
tendency, such that likelihood ratings were less discriminative of risky choices among 397 
participants who accepted many gambles than among those who accepted only few gambles. 398 
This finding could imply that groups of individuals who more often engage in risky activities 399 
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(e.g., offenders; Pachur et al., 2010; Rolison et al., 2013) may be less able to report reliably 400 
on their likelihood of risk taking. Hence, group differences in apparent risk taking might 401 
depend on whether risk taking propensities are assessed using self-report or behavioral tasks. 402 
Nevertheless, further research is required to establish whether this finding can be replicated. 403 
Likelihood rating scales and behavioral tasks differ both in their reliance on self-404 
report and in their response format. Self-report tasks typically use Likert scales, whereas 405 
binary choice options are normally used to elicit preferences in behavioral tasks. A wealth of 406 
research has shown that expressed preference can differ as a function of how it is elicited 407 
(Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). For instance, while people may 408 
choose a small reward that is likely over a larger reward that is less likely, they will often 409 
assign the latter a higher numerical value (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Our comparison of 410 
self-reported likelihood of risk taking and choice behavior confounds effects self-report with 411 
the influence of response format. Crucially, however, our current motivation was to assess the 412 
degree to which likelihood ratings used in self-report tasks map upon actual choice behavior. 413 
Prominent risk taking questionnaires (e.g., DOSPERT, Weber et al., 2002; gambles, Holt & 414 
Laury, 2002) regularly used to elicit risk preferences equally confound self-report and 415 
response format. Future research that seeks to disentangle these two features of risk taking 416 
measures could promote the development of risk taking scales that afford a better mapping 417 
across measures. 418 
Despite the above constraints on the correspondence between likelihood ratings and 419 
choice, overall the former seems to be a good proxy for the latter. Moreover, our data show in 420 
several ways that in their likelihood rating participants set their response criterion—the 421 
threshold on the strength of attractiveness continuum beyond which gambles receive a high 422 
likelihood of being accepted—adaptively to the base rate of their risky choices. Specifically 423 
differences in acceptance of the gamble between ambiguous and unambiguous conditions, 424 
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due to age, and individual differences in general were accompanied by parallel shifts in 425 
response criterion: when people made more risky choices, they also tended to set a more 426 
liberal criterion in their likelihood ratings. This finding dovetails with results from studies of 427 
recognition memory, showing that people adaptively adjust their response criterion according 428 
to the base rate of signal events (Estes & Maddox, 1995; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007).  429 
Our study has a number of possible limitations. First, we studied people’s choice 430 
behavior for gambles with hypothetical outcomes, rather than ones that had real financial 431 
consequences. However, our current goal was to probe the relationship between self-report 432 
and choice for tasks that had similar potential outcomes. Had we incentivised responses in the 433 
choice task, the consequences of participants’ choices could have distorted any natural 434 
relationship between likelihood ratings and choice. Further research may seek to explore 435 
whether this relationship is strengthened or weakened when both the likelihood ratings and 436 
choices are incentivised by real financial outcomes. Second, we asked participants to report 437 
on their likelihood of accepting monetary gambles. Self-report scales are designed to capture 438 
broad behavioral tendencies that are stable across occasions and situations (e.g., ‘Driving a 439 
car without wearing a seatbelt’, DOSPERT; Blais & Weber, 2006). The task we presented to 440 
participants, especially in the context of unambiguous gambles, contained highly specific 441 
one-shot instances for which self-reported risk taking may be more variable across occasions 442 
and situations. Nonetheless, choices between specific monetary gambles are commonly used 443 
to estimate individuals’ underlying risk attitude (Becker, Deckers, Dohmen, Falk, & Kosse, 444 
2012; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, & Sunde, 2010; Glöckner & Pachur, 2012; MacCrimmon & 445 
Wehrung, 1990). Third, we studied the relationship between self-report and choice only in the 446 
financial domain. While it was important to ensure for our present purposes that participants’ 447 
likelihood ratings and their choices were both based on the same gambling problems, the 448 
relationship between self-report and choice might depend on the risk domain. Potentially, 449 
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some domains of risk (e.g., the health domain) contain greater ambiguity about the possible 450 
outcomes and probabilities than others. 451 
Conclusion 452 
 We demonstrate that self-reported likelihoods of engaging in a risky activity reflect a 453 
person’s actual choice rather well—at least under conditions of clearly defined activities and 454 
when collecting both measures in the same session. However, we also found that the coupling 455 
between likelihood ratings and actual choice behavior is loosened when part of the 456 
characteristics of the choice options are unknown and in older age. We may know our inner 457 
daredevil, but not in every guise.458 
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Figure 1. The dots represent the average likelihood rating as a function of the (binned) 
percentage of accepted gambles at (A) low and high levels of discriminability and (B) 
response criterion values above and below zero. The lines represented the predicted slopes 
represent quadratic and cubic effects of accepted gambles on likelihood ratings, respectively.  
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Figure 2. Predicted discriminability and response criterion for (A and B) the unambiguous 
and ambiguous conditions and (C and D) individual differences in risk taking, measured as 
the percentage of accepted gambles. Vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals.   
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Unambiguous and ambiguous gambles  
Unambiguous gambles  Ambiguous gambles 
Gain Loss Win Lose Expected 
value 
 Gain Loss Win Lose Expected 
value 
10 10 25% 75% -5  ? 10 75% 25% 12.5 
10 20 25% 75% -12.5  ? 10 50% 50% 5 
10 30 25% 75% -20  ? 10 25% 75% -2.5 
20 10 25% 75% -2.5  ? 20 75% 25% 10 
20 20 25% 75% -10  ? 20 50% 50% 0 
20 30 25% 75% -17.5  ? 20 25% 75% -10 
30 10 25% 75% 0  ? 30 75% 25% 7.5 
30 20 25% 75% -7.5  ? 30 50% 50% -5 
30 30 25% 75% -15  ? 30 25% 75% -17.5 
10 10 50% 50% 0  30 ? 75% 25% 17.5 
10 20 50% 50% -5  30 ? 50% 50% 5 
10 30 50% 50% -10  30 ? 25% 75% -7.5 
20 10 50% 50% 5  20 ? 75% 25% 10 
20 20 50% 50% 0  20 ? 50% 50% 0 
20 30 50% 50% -5  20 ? 25% 75% -10 
30 10 50% 50% 10  10 ? 75% 25% 2.5 
30 20 50% 50% 5  10 ? 50% 50% -5 
30 30 50% 50% 0  10 ? 25% 75% -12.5 
10 10 75% 25% 5  30 10 ? ? 10 
10 20 75% 25% 2.5  30 20 ? ? 5 
10 30 75% 25% 0  30 30 ? ? 0 
20 10 75% 25% 12.5  20 10 ? ? 5 
20 20 75% 25% 10  20 20 ? ? 0 
20 30 75% 25% 7.5  20 30 ? ? -5 
30 10 75% 25% 20  10 10 ? ? 0 
30 20 75% 25% 17.5  10 20 ? ? -5 
30 30 75% 25% 15  10 30 ? ? -10 
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Appendix B 
Instructions used in for unambiguous gambling problems: 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in our study. The study explores how people think about 
uncertain outcomes. 
We have designed a set of gambles that we would like you to evaluate. Each gamble has two 
possible outcomes (a win or a loss). Each outcome is characterized by an amount ($10, $20, 
or $30) that can be won or lost and a chance (i.e., probability) of winning or losing (25%, 
50%, or 75%): 
(a) win or loss amount ($10, $20, $30)                                                                                          
(b) chance of winning or losing (25%, 50%, 75%) 
Here is an example of the kind of gamble you will be shown: 
  Gamble:       You win       $10 with a chance of 25% 
                       You lose      $30 with a chance of 75% 
To help you understand these chances, you can think of a bag containing 100 tokens, of 
which 25 are blue and the remaining 75 are red. Imagine drawing one of the tokens from the 
bag without looking. If you draw one of the 25 blue tokens you win $10. If you draw one of 
the 75 red tokens you lose $30.   
In total, you will be shown 54 such gambles, divided into two blocks. For one block, you will 
be asked whether or not you would accept each gamble. For another block, you will instead 
be asked how likely you would be to accept each gamble. You may begin with either block. 
Finally, you will be asked 5 short demographic questions. 
Instructions used in for ambiguous gambling problems: 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in our study. The study explores how people think about 
uncertain outcomes. 
We have designed a set of gambles that we would like you to evaluate. Each gamble has two 
possible outcomes (a win or a loss) that occur with some probability. The outcome can be one 
of three amounts of money, either $10, $20, or $30, that can be either won or lost. The chance 
(i.e., probability) of winning or losing can be either 25%, 50%, or 75%. 
To help you understand these chances, you can think of a bag containing 100 tokens. When, 
for instance, the chance of winning is 75% and the chance of losing is 25%, there are 75 blue 
tokens and the remaining 25 are red. Imagine drawing one of the tokens from the bag without 
looking. If you draw one of the 75 blue tokens you win the specified amount. If you draw one 
of the 25 red tokens you lose the specified amount.  
For each gamble, either the gain amount ($10, $20, $30), loss amount ($10, $20, $30), or the 
chance of winning or losing (25%, 50%, 75%) will be unknown. 
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Here is an example of the kind of gamble you will be shown: 
Example 1: 
Gamble:       You win       $10 with a chance of 25% 
                     You lose      $ ?  with a chance of 75% 
In this gamble, you have a 25% chance of winning $10 and a 75% chance of losing an 
unknown amount of either $10, $20, or $30. 
Example 2: 
Gamble:       You win       $20 with a chance of ? % 
                     You lose      $10 with a chance of ? % 
In this gamble, you have a chance of winning $20 or to lose $10, but the probability of 
winning or losing is unknown.  
You will first be shown 54 such gambles, divided into two blocks. For one block, you will be 
asked whether or not you would accept each gamble. For another block, you will instead be 
asked how likely you would be to accept each gamble. You may begin with either block. You 
will then be asked to evaluate a final set of 27 gambles. Finally, you will be asked 4 short 
demographic questions. 
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Appendix C 
We conducted a mixed-effects logistic regression on participants’ decisions (accept 
vs. reject) and included the gamble’s expected value, the condition (ambiguous vs 
unambiguous), and participants’ age (as a continuous variable) as predictors. Information 
about either the gain amount, loss amount, or the chances to win and lose was missing on 
ambiguous gambles. However, participants were told that the missing gain or loss amount 
was equal to $10, $20, or $30, and that the missing chances were 25%, 50%, or 75%. Thus, 
we calculated the expected value of ambiguous gambles by substituting the missing 
information with the middle amount (i.e., $20) and probability (i.e., 50%).1 Gambles with a 
higher expected value were more often accepted (b = 0.23, t = 51.45, p < .001; Panel A in 
Figure A1). Ambiguous gambles were less often accepted (34%) than unambiguous (40%) 
gambles (b = -0.44, t = 2.29, p = .022; Panel A in Figure A1), indicating ambiguity aversion. 
As age increased, fewer gambles were accepted (b = -0.02, t = 2.51, p = .012). Two-way 
interaction terms were included in a second block and revealed an interaction between 
condition and the expected value of the gambles (b = -0.07, t = 7.80, p < .001). This is 
because participants were less responsive to changes in the expected value of ambiguous 
gambles (b = 0.20, t = 33.95, p < .001) than they were for unambiguous gambles (b = 0.28, t 
= 36.95, p < .001). Panel A in Figure A1 shows that this was true particularly when the 
expected value was positive, further indicating that participants’ ambiguity aversion was 
partly driven by their pessimistic beliefs about the missing information. Age also interacted 
with the expected value of the gambles (b = -0.001, t = 2.11, p = .035), whereby older age 
was associated with a reduced sensitivity to a gamble’s expected value. 
                                                          
1
 The expected values of ambiguous gambles provided a better fit in the regression model when based on the 
middle amounts ($20) and chances (50%) than when based on participants’ judgments about the most likely 
missing values. Nonetheless, participants’ mean judgments for the missing values reflected their risk aversion 
for ambiguous gambles. They judged a missing gain as equally likely to be small (32%), medium (36%), or 
large (33%), but judged a missing loss as more likely to be medium (36%) or large (40%) than small (24%), and 
judged a missing chance to win as more likely to be low (36%) or medium (40%) than high (24%) in 
probability.  
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In addition to deciding whether to accept or reject the gambles, participants rated in 
a separate block the likelihood that they would accept each one. We conducted a mixed 
effects linear regression on their likelihood ratings and included the gamble’s expected value, 
the condition (ambiguous vs unambiguous), and participants’ age (as a continuous variable) 
as predictors. In keeping with our analysis of participants’ decisions, the expected values of 
ambiguous gambles were calculated by substituting the missing information with the middle 
amount ($20) and probability (50%) on the scale of possible values. Participants rated a 
higher likelihood that they would accept lotteries with a higher expected value (b = 0.12, t = 
92.90, p < .001; Panel B in Figure A1). As age increased, participants rated a lower 
likelihood of accepting lotteries (b = -0.01, t = 2.23, p = .026). Overall, participants rated that 
they were less likely to accept ambiguous lotteries (M = 3.19, SD = 1.97) than unambiguous 
lotteries (M = 3.42, SD = 2.19), but this difference was not significant (b = -0.18, t = 1.80, p = 
.073; Panel B in Figure A1). However, when two-way interaction terms were included in a 
second block, condition interacted with the expected value of the lotteries (b = -0.02, t = 8.65, 
p < .001). This was because participants were less responsive to changes in the expected 
value of ambiguous lotteries (b = 0.02, t = 46.03, p < .001) than they were for unambiguous 
lotteries (b = 0.13, t = 75.58, p < .001; Panel B in Figure A1). Finally, there was a marginally 
significant interaction between age and the expected value of the lotteries (b = -0.0002, t = 
1.91, p = .056), indicating that older age was associated with a reduced sensitivity to a 
gamble’s expected value. 
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Figure A1. Predicted probability (A) and rated likelihood (B) of accepting gambles 
according to their expected value and predicted probability (C) of accepting gambles 
according to likelihood ratings. The predicted slopes represent cubic effects of expected value 
on the probability of accepting gambles and likelihood ratings. The dots represent mean 
group values. 
 
